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The Willfulness Requirement: A Chameleon
in the Legal Arena
I. INTRODUCTION
The term willful, deeply rooted in the common law, is a culpability
requirement employed by most states in criminal statutory language.' Yet, it has
a perplexing characteristic, specifically that it takes on different meanings in
different contexts. When drafting the Model Penal Code, the drafters included four
"kinds of culpability":2 purposely,3 knowingly,4 recklessly,5 and negligently,6 while
deliberately excluding the term willfulness" as a mental state because of its
"unusually ambiguous" nature.8
Willfulness is defined by the Model Penal Code solely because of its "currency
and existence" in offenses outside of the Code, which creates the need and
"desirability" for "clarification."9 Section 2.02 (8) provides that "an offense [is]
committed willfully... [when] a person acts knowingly with respect to the material
elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements appears."
The explanatory note states that this definition is often deviated from in
circumstances when the courts have interpreted the willfulness requirement to
interject a supplementary prerequisite "of motive or of purpose" or to establish the
foundation for a specific defense grounded on the accused's mental state.'" To
adjust to these particular circumstances, in which judicial interpretation of the
requirement has imposed different meanings, the definition in Section 2.02(8) of
the Model Penal Code may not be applicable." Yet, the Model Penal Code
recognizes this as a possibility, unlike many patternjury instructions and courts that
try to apply one inflexible definition. 2
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1. Jeremy M. Miller, White Collar Criminal Liability Without Mental Fault in the 1990's, 96
Com. L.J. 353 (1991).
2. Model Penal Code § 2.02(2) (Official Draft 1985).
3. Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(a) (Official Draft 1985).
4. Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(b) (Official Draft 1985).
5. Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c) (Official Draft 1985).
6. Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(d) (Official Draft 1985).
7. American Law Institute Proceedings 160 (1955) (conversation of Mr. Wechsler with Judge
Learned Hand).
8. Model Penal Code § 2.02(8) explanatory note at 228 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985).
9. Id.
10. Model Penal Code § 2.02(8) Commentary at 249 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985).
11. Id.
12. See generally Pattern Crim. Jury Instr. 5th Cir. § 1.38 (West ed. 1997) (which discusses this
problematic approach taken by previous pattern jury instructions and courts). See infra text
accompanying notes 73-82.
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Moreover, the term willfully has "defied any consistent interpretation by the
courts."' 3 One commentator stated, "[No] word has shown more confusion than
'willfully."" 4 However, it remains "[olne of the most common terms in statutory
crimes to designate a culpability requirement."'" Although the current Louisiana
Criminal Statutes use "willful" throughout, 6 they do not define the term,
"presumably because of the imprecision in the concept." 7 This article explores the
historical jurisprudence of "willfully". in the United States Supreme Court, the
United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and Louisiana courts, the present
interpretations of the term in particular contexts, possible implications of recent
decisions, and the validity of the term in the criminal context in Louisiana.
II. UNrrED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES
A. "Willfully" and Its Amorphous Form
As early. as 1933 in United States v. Murdock," the United States Supreme
Court confronted this inherently elusive term, noting that an "[ajid in arriving at the
meaning of the word 'willfully' may be afforded by the context in which it is
used." 9  Moreover, in Spies v. United States,20 the Court noted the same
proposition, stating that willful "is a word of many meanings, its construction often
being influenced by its context."2 ' The Court in Murdock explored the different
connotations that the word has taken, stating that ordinarily it means "intentional,
or knowing, or voluntarily" as opposed to "accidental."22  However, it
acknowledged previous United States Supreme Court decisions that adopted Chief
13. United States v. Granda, 565 F.2d 922, 924 (5th Cir. 1978).
14. Michael E: Tigar, "Willfulness" and "Ignorance" in Federal Criminal Law, 37 Clev. St. L
Rev. 525, 526 (1989).
15. Model Penal Code § 2.02(8) Commentary at 248-50 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985).
16. See generally La. R.S. 14:40.2 (1997); La. R.S. 14:67.5 (1997); La. R.S. 14:67.10(A)(4)
(1997); La. R.S. 14:79 (Supp. 1999); La. R.S. 14:83.2 (1986); La. R.S.14:92.3 (Supp. 1999); La. R.S.
14:100.1 (1986); La. R.S. 14:126.2 (1986); La. R.S. 14:133.1 (1986); La. R.S. 14:212 (Supp. 1999);
La. R.S. 14:219 (1986); La. R.S. 14:220 (Supp. 1999); La. R.S. 14:320 (1986); La. R.S. 14:328 (1986);
La R.S. 14:329.3 (1986); La. R.S. 14:329.5 (1986); La. R.S. 14:329.7 (1986); La. R.S. 14:332 (1986);
La. R.S. 14:368 (1986); La. R.S. 14:390.2 (1986); La. R.S. 14:403 (Supp. 1999); La. R.S. 14:403.1((G)
(1986); La. R.S. 14:403.2(J) (Supp. 1999).
17. Lee Hargrave, Criminal Law, 42 La. L. Rev. 541, 543 (1982).
18. 290 U.S. 389, 54 S. Ct. 223 (1933), overruled on other grounds, by Murphy v. Waterfront
Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 84 S. Ct. 1594 (1964).
19. Murdock, 290 U.S. at 395, 54 S. Ct. at 226.
20. 317 U.S. 492, 63 S. Ct. 364 (1943). This case involved the willful attempt to evade or defeat
taxes. The Court stated that nonpayment of a tax when applied to failure to make a return, when
"voluntary and purposeful as distinguished from accidental, omission to make a timely return might
meet the test of willfulness." Id. at 497-98, 63 S. Ct. at 367. Furthermore, the majority declared that
tax laws were not to be imposed "to penalize frank difference of opinion or innocent errors made despite
the exercise of reasonable care." Id. at 496, 63 S. Ct. at 367.
21. Id. at 497,63 S. Ct. at 367.
22. 290 U.S. at 394, 54 S. Ct. at 225.
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Justice Shaw's view23 in a criminal context when it stated that "[willful] generally
means an act done with a bad purpose."'24
In the 1998 decision Bryan v. United States," the Court purportedly accepted
this view, stating that "in criminal law it... typically refers to a culpable state of
mind." '26 Furthermore, it is commonly understood as a term manifesting an "evil
intent without justifiable excuse."27 The Court has noted on several occasions that
the term has a knowledge components and connotes an act done with the belief that
it is unlawful.29 This knowledge requirement is currently strictly enforced by
federal courts for willful infractions of some federal criminal tax laws" and,
structuring of currency transaction statutes.3' Thus, it is clear that the term willful
has a peculiar, chameleon-like nature having different meanings in different
contexts.
In Bryan, the defendant was prohibited by law from dealing in firearms
because he had not met the federal requirement of obtaining a license.
Nonetheless, the defendant used "straw purchasers"32 to acquire firearms. He
assured these purchasers that he would remove the serial numbers from the
firearms before he sold them on Brooklyn street corners. 3" The United States
Supreme Court found that there was sufficient evidence to prove the defendant
knew that his conduct was unlawful.' Federal law forbids anyone from "willfully"
violating a provision of chapter forty-four of the United States Code, which
criminalizes certain conduct involving firearms.3" The accused in Bryan was
charged with "willfully" violating a provision that prohibits selling firearms
23. Spurr v. United States, 174 U.S. 728, 19 S. Ct. 812 (1899); Potter v. United States, 155 U.S.
438, 15 S. Ct. 144 (1894); Felton v. United States, 96 U.S. (6 Otto) 699 (1877).
24. Murdock v. United States, 290 U.S. 389, 394, 54 S. Ct. 223,225 (1933). See also Heikkinen
v. United States, 355 U.S. 273, 279, 78 S. Ct. 299, 303 (1958).
25. 524 U.S. 184, 118 S. Ct. 1939 (1998).
26. Id. at 191, 118 S. Ct. at 1945.
27. Joel Prentiss Bishop, 1 Bishop on Criminal Law § 428 (9th ed. 1923); Felton, 96 U.S. at 702;
Potter, 155 U.S. at 446, 15 S. Ct. at 147; Spur', 174 U.S. at 735, 19 S, Ct. at 815. See also Murdock,
290 U.S. at 394, 54 S. Ct. at 225; Heikkinen, 355 U.S. at 279, 78 S. Ct. 303.
28. Felton, 96 U.S. at 702; Spurr, 174 U.S. at 734, 19 S. Ct. at 815.
29. Murdock, 290 U.S. at 394,54S. Ct, at 225; Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137,114
S. Ct. 655, 657 (1994).
30. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991).
31. Ratzlaf, 510U.S. 135, 114S. Ct. 655.
32. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 189, 118 S. Ct. 1939, 1944 (1998). The defendant
used "so-called straw purchasers" to obtain arms that he could not have acquired himself.
33. Id.
34. "Why else would he make use of straw purchasers and assure them that he would shave the
serial numbers off the guns? Moreover, the street comer sales are not consistent with a good-faith belief
in the legality of the enterprise." Id. at 189 n.8, 118 S. Ct. at 1944 n.8.
35. 18 U.S.C.S. § 924(a)(1)(D)(1996):
§ 924. Penalties.
(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, subsection (b), (c), or (f) of this
section, or in section 929, whoever-
(D) willfully violates any other provision of this chapter, shall be fined under this tide,
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
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without a federal license. 6 However, he maintained that he could not be convicted
because the term "willfully" does not merely require that a defendant know his
conduct is unlawful in a general sense, but it also contains the more stringent
requirement of specific knowledge of the law. Under this requirement, the
government would have to prove that he knew of the federal licensing
requirement.37
The Court rejected the defendant's argument and held the term "willfully" in
Section 924 (a)(1)(D) requires only that the defendant has "knowledge that the
conduct is unlawful"; 38 further proof that he also knew of the federal licensing
requirement is not required. The majority stated that willful is a "word of many
meanings."39 Furthermore, Justice Scalia dissented in Bryan, acknowledging the
troublesome nature of statutes that contain a willfulness requirement. He noted that
the word "willfully" is "notoriously malleable."'
Generally, purposeful lawbreakers violate the law with a "bad purpose" or
"evil motive," knowing that they are breaking the law; therefore, "it does not matter
what meaning of 'wilful' is applied."' Nonetheless, sometimes the variance in the
definitions of the term is critical.42 For instance, in United States v. Murdock,43 the
defendant declared what he thought to be his constitutional right against self
incrimination by not answering questions posed to him by a governmental official.
The constitutional privilege was not applicable in that given situation, and he was
arrested for "willfully" declining to respond to questions."
If the definition of willful is simply intentional, the defendant in Murdock was
guilty of the crime by reason of his intentional refusal to answer questions.
However, if the definition of willful was that of an intentional "act done with a bad
purpose, 45 the defendant was not guilty because he lacked the requisite evil
motive. The Court held that since the defendant based his actions on the erroneous
36. 18 U.S.C.S. § 922(a)(1)(A)(1996):
§ 922. Unlawful Acts.
(a) It shall be unlawful-
(1) for any person-
(A) except a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer, to engage in the
business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, or in the course of such
business to ship, transport, or receive any firearm in interstate or foreign commerce;
37. The accused argues that the term "willfully" in 18 U.S.C.S. § 924(a)(1)(D) (1996) should be
construed in the same manner as it is in tax statutes. See infra text accompanying notes 48-74.
38. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 196, 118 S. Ct. 1939, 1947 (1998).
39. Id. at 191. 118 S. Ct. at 1944. See generally Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 114 S.
Ct. 655 (1994); Spies v. United States. 317 U.S. 492, 63 S. Ct. 364 (1943); United States v. Murdock,
290 U.S. 389, 54 S. Ct. 223 (1933).
40. Bryan, 524 U.S. at 201, 118 S. Ct. at 1950 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41. Joshua Dressier, Understanding Criminal Law § 10.04[C] (2d ed. 1995).
42. Id.
43. 290 U.S. 389, 395, 54 S. Ct. 223, 225 (1933), overruled on other grounds by Murphy v.
Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 84 S. Ct. 1594 (1964).
44. Murdock, 290 U.S. at 395, 54 S. Ct. at 225.
45. Id. at 394, 54 S. Ct. at 225 (citing Felton v. United States, 96 U.S. (6 Otto) 399 (1877); Potter
v. United States, 155 U.S. 438, 15 S. Ct. 144 (1894); Spurr v. United States, 174 U.S. 728, 19 S. Ct.
812 (1899)).
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assumption that he had a constitutional right to decline to answer, he was without
evil motive and acted without the expectation of violating the law. Therefore, he
was not guilty. In cases such as the latter where such a definition is employed for
willful, there is an exception to the general rule that ignorance of the law is no
excuse.' Since the Murdock decision, the courts have found an increasing
number of cases where the difference in meanings for the term willful is significant
as to the outcome of the case, such as tax and structuring transactions.
B. Tax and Structuring Transactions Cases-A League of Their Own
In Bryan, the defendant's argument that the term "willfully" in 18 U.S.C.§
924(a)(1)(D) requires special knowledge of the law was borrowed from the Court's
comparable constructions in willful violations of the tax law cases47 and the
willfulness requirement in the structuring of currency transactions to evade a bank
reporting obligation.' In essence, the defendant in Bryan claimed that the
prosecution must prove that he desired a particular unlawful outcome and that he
knew the result was illegal: "intentional violation of a known legal duty,"'49 much
like the requirement in tax and transaction structuring cases.'
In Cheek v. United States,5 the defendant acknowledged that he had not filed
his taxes, but stated that he did not believe this constituted willful conduct because
he honestly theorized that the federal tax laws were unconstitutional, based on his
instruction by a group that adhered to this belief." The United States Supreme
Court stated that "'willfully' attempting to evade income taxes and failing to file
income tax returns... requires the Government to prove that the law imposed a
duty on the defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty, and that he voluntarily
and intentionally violated that duty."" The Court stated that the defendant's belief
that tax laws were invalid was unrelated to willfulness and distinguished the case
from that in which innocent oversights or misunderstandings originate due to the
intricacy of the tax laws.'
46. Dressier, supra note 41.
47. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193, 118 S. Ct. 1939, 1946 (1998); Cheek v. United
States, 498 U.S. 192, 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991).
48. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 114 S. Ct. 655 (1994).
49. Michael E. Tigar, "Willfulness" and "Ignorance" in Federal Criminal Law, 37 Clev. St. L
Rev. 525, 529 (1989).
50. The defendant argued that the willfulness requirement in his situation was analogous to that
in Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991), a tax case. 524 U.S. at 193, 118 S. Ct.
at 1946.
51. 498 U.S. 192, 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 201, 111 S. Ct. at 610.
54. Id. at 205-06, 111 S. Ct. at 612-13. Therefore, the Court carved "out an exception to the
traditional rule" that "ignorance of the law is no excuse" because the typical citizen has trouble
understanding the magnitude of the responsibilities and liabilities imposed by the tax laws; "[c]ongress
has accordingly softened the impact.., by making specific intent to violate the law an element of
certain federal criminal tax offenses." Id. at 199-200, 111 S. Ct. at 609.
20001
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The Court held that if an accused honestly concluded that he was not involved
in unlawful activities, he should not be convicted, despite the fact that his belief
was not "objectively reasonable." 5 Thus, Cheek established that an accused's
subjective awareness of the law decides whether he is guilty for willfully violating
the requirement of filing income taxes.56 This conclusion was primarily a policy
decision exacted by the Court to prevent innocent citizens from being punished
when they had no knowledge that they were engaged in activities which were
unlawful.57
Similarly, in Ratzlaf v. United States,58 a structuring transaction case, the
United States Supreme Court held that the government must prove three conditions:
(1) a defendant had knowledge that a financial establishment must report monetary
dealings in excess of ten thousand dollars, (2) defendant's intention to evade such
reporting, and (3) the defendant knew the structuring in which he engaged in was
illegal59 In Ratzlaf, the accused incurred a debt of $160,000 at a casino. He was
told by casino executives that a currency exchange of more than $10,000 was
required to be reported by banks as per state and federal law.' The casino
executive told the defendant he could avoid the requirement by purchasing
cashier's checks for less than $10,000 at different banks to pay his debt.
The defendant contended that he could not be found guilty of "willfully
violating" the antistructuring offense only by reason of his knowledge that a
commercial economic establishment must inform and give documentation of
monetary transactions above $10,000.61 To obtain a conviction, he maintained, the
prosecution must prove he had knowledge of the unlawfulness of the structuring
which he undertook.62 The United States Supreme Court agreed. The Court
stressed in its analysis that structuring is not intrinsically corrupt.63 The Court
appeared to be influenced by the principle that penalizing a person for an action
without a determination of whether a choice was made to engage in unlawful
55. Dwight W. Stone II, Cheek v. United States: Finally, a Precise Definition of the Willfulness
Requirement in Federal Tax Crimes, 51 Md. L Rev. 224 (1992).
56. See Lindsey H. Simon, The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Word "Willful":
Ignorance of the Law as an Excuse to Prosecutionsfor Structuring Currency Transactions, 85 J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 1161, 1172 (1995).
57. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 199, 111 S. Ct. at 609. The Court made the distinction between
subjective belief and an objectively reasonable awareness, opting not to hold people to the stricter
objectively reasonable standard. Undoubtedly, this decision protects more defendants.
58. 510 U.S. 135, 114 S. Ct. 655 (1994).
59. Id. at 138, 114 S. Ct. at 657-58 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 137, 114 S. Ct. at 657.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 146, 114 S; Ct. at 662. "[W]e are unpersuaded by the argument that structuring is so
obviously 'evil' or inherently 'bad' that the 'willfulness' requirement is satisfied irrespective of the
defendant's knowledge of the illegality of the structuring." The Court was impressed with the fact that
the defendant subjectively believed that the structuring which he undertook was not unlawful and that
this belief was objectively reasonable. This made for a stronger case for the defendant than in Cheek,
498 U.S. 192, 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991).
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activity disregards the standard inherent in due process: that a choice to break the
law must precede punishment.64
The Court was influenced by the rule of lenity." This rule is based on dual
notions: 66 "a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the
common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is
passed"; secondly, the "legislature and not courts should define criminal activity."
The rule directs courts "to construe ambiguous penal statutes strictly in favor of the
accused.""
The majority in Bryan freely distinguished these types of cases because they
involve very complex laws that risk one's conviction when "engaged in apparently
innocent conduct."69 The Court reasoned in Bryan that "willfully" in 18 United
States Code section 924 (a)(1)(D) required a different standard because this statute
did not jeopardize any innocent persons, since firearm transactions conducted by
unlicensed firearms dealers is not mere innocent conduct and involves a bad
purpose.7 Although the tax and structuring cases rationale was not extended to the
federal licensing requirement in Bryan, there is no reason why this logic should not
be applied to other statutes when equity demands a more just outcome. For
example, the definition of willful should not be confined to "intentional" in those
statutes where there is a possibility that such reasoning could jeopardize merely
innocent conduct. It seems necessary for the courts to individually interpret each
statute that contains the terms willful or willfully to determine whether the
legislature intended that the defendant have an evil motive or knowledge that his
or her action is illegal when violating the law.
III. THE FIFfrH CIRcurr: A MINoRrrY APPROACH
As early as 1955, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the United States Supreme
Court's Murdockdecision,7 which states that in advancing toward an interpretation
of the term "willfully," courts should take guidance from the context in which the
term is used.72 A 1978 decision stated that the term "defied any consistent
64. See Rachael Siminoff, Ratzlafv. United States: The Meaning of "Willful" and the Demands
of Due Process, 28 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 397, 409 (1995).
65. See id. at 400.
66. See Ron S. Brand, Student Loan Fraud: Intent to Deceive Not Required Under Section
1097(A) of the Higher Education Act, 10 DePaul Bus. LJ. 63, 101 (1997).
67. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27, 51 S. Ct. 340, 341 (1931).
68. Ross E. Davies, A Public Trust Exception to the Rule of Lenity, 63 U. Chi. L Rev. 1175
(1996). See also Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223,246, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 2063 (1993) with Justice
Scalia dissenting, explaining the rule of lenity. See, e.g., McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359-
60, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2881 (1987) (stating that the rule of lenity requires the court to choose the
"harsher" of "two rational readings of a criminal statute... only when congress has spoken in clear and
definite language.").
69. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 194, 118 S. Ct. 1939, 1947 (1998).
70. Id.
71. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 395, 54 S. Ct. 223, 225 (1933).
72. McBride v. United States, 225 F.2d 249, 254 (5th Cir. 1955).
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interpretation[s] by the courts."" Despite the court's recognition of willfully's
chameleon-like characteristics, the Fifth Circuit Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions
for 1978 deviated from these cases and included "willfully" as a component of
nearly all offenses.74 Furthermore, the pattern jury instructions assigned one
definition for the term for every offense: "The word 'willfully,' as that term has
been used from time to time in these instructions, means that the act was committed
voluntarily and purposely, with the specific intent to do something the law forbids;
that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law."
However, the 1992 Federal Jury Practice and Instructions stated that although
the term is commonly used as an essential requirement in criminal statutes, it has
"eluded precise definition."'76 Yet, even though the 1978 instructions have been
criticized, the standard definition in the 1978 instructions has left lingering effects;
the term is recurrently inserted in indictments even though it may not be in the
particular criminal statute that the accused is charged with violating.77 This
standard makes elements of crimes harder to satisfy. Nevertheless, this practice
should be strongly discouraged because the term willfulness should only be used
"where the statute makes it an element of the offense" in order for the
"Congressional purpose ... to be accomplished," 9 and because the immutable
definition of the term "is not accurate in every situation. '
As early as 1980 the Seventh Circuit Committee on Federal Jury Instructions
recognized a similar dilemma. The committee suggested that an instruction
defining the term willfully should not be conveyed, except in those cases where the
word appears in the statute that the defendant is accused of violating."'
Furthermore, the committee stated, "[I]t is rarely desirable to give a general
definition of 'willfully."'8 2 Yet, the recent 1997 Pattern Jury Instructions for
73. United States v. Granda, 565 F.2d 922, 924 (5th Cir. 1978).
74. See Pattern Crim. Jury Instr. 5th Cir., supra note 12.
75. Id.
76. Edward J. Devitt et al., Fed. Jury Prac. & Instr. § 17.01 (West ed. 1992).
77. "The word 'willfully' is frequently included in the indictment, even when not required by
statute or case law." Pattern Crim. Jury Instr. 5th Cir., supra note 12, at § 1.38.
78. Id.
79. Model Crim. Jury Instr. 9th Cir. § 5.5 (West ed. 1997). Indictments and instructions should
follow "the relevant statutory definition of the offense... for the purpose of accomplishing what the
statute prohibits."
80. Pattern Crim. Jury Instr. 5th Cir., supra note 12, at § 1.38 (stating that the United States
Supreme Court has corroborated this position stating that "'[flew areas of criminal law pose more
difficulty than the proper definition of the mens rea required for any particular crime."' (quoting United
States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394,403, 100 S. Ct. 624,631 (1980)). Furthermore, "[in Ratzlafv. United
States, 510 U.S. 135,141, 114 S. Ct. 655,659 (1994), the Supreme Court, quoting from Spies v. United
States, 317 U.S. 492, 497, 63 S. Ct. 364, 367 (1943), recognized that '[w]illful is a word of many
meanings,' and 'its construction [is] often... influenced by its context."'
81. Devittetal., supra note 76, at § 17.05.
82. "If the statute uses the term and it must be defined, it should be defined in a manner tailoring
it to the details of the particular offense charged." Fed. Crim. Jury Instr. 7th Cir. § 4.09 (West ed.
1999).
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criminal cases of the Fifth Circuit expressly declined to adopt the Seventh Circuit's
recommendation in many circumstances. 3
IV. LOUISIANA: AN ATTEMPT TO ACCOMPLISH A MORE REASONABLE
WILLFULNESS REQUIREMENT
A. In General
In State of Louisiana v. D.L," a juvenile was charged with six counts of
negligent injuring.s The petition and affidavit charged the accused with "wilfully
and unlawfully" inflicting, by criminal negligence, injury on another person." The
minor claimed he was prejudiced by the erroneous inclusion of the term willfully.
The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal reasoned that there was no
prejudice because a petition's purpose is to give notice to a juvenile and an
opportunity to defend." Furthermore, at the close of the trial, the juvenile court
specifically referred to the error and stated that no intent was required as per
statute."8 Many times when the term is indiscriminately inserted, it confuses the
law, but often times will not prejudice the defendant because it imposes a stringent
mental requirement which must be met.
This error is by no means a new problem in Louisiana. In State v. Vinzant, 9
the Louisiana Supreme Court was confronted with a similar problem. The
defendant was charged with involuntary homicide, a crime in Louisiana in 1942.
At the time the involuntary homicide statute read: "[A]ny person who, by
operation or use of any vehicle in a grossly negligent or grossly reckless manner,
but not wilfully or wantonly, causes the death of another person, shall be guilty of
the crime of involuntary homicide. . . ." Yet, the accused's bill of information
defining this offense included the additional terms "wilfully, maliciously,
feloniously and unlawfully," immediately preceding the charge.9 Nevertheless, the
court held these words were mere surplusage and should be regarded as such.'
In dictum, the Louisiana Supreme Court did attempt to define willfully in
Vinzant, stating:
83. The Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions authors reasoned that the Fifth Circuit has
"engrafted an element of'wilfulness' even when that term does not appear in the statute." Pattern Crim.
Jury Instr. 5th Cir., supra note 12, at § 1.38.
84. 697 So. 2d 706 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1997).
85. La. R.S. 14:39 (1997). This statute does not include intent or willfulness in the definition of
negligent injuring.
86. 697 So. 2d at 710.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 7 So. 2d 917 (La. 1942).
90. 1930 La. Acts.No. 64, § 1.
91. 7 So. 2d at 920. See also State v. Hudgens, 179 So. 57 (La. 1938). The defendant was
charged with involuntary homicide; written into the bill were the words "unlawfully, wilfully and
feloniously." The court held the words "must be rejected as surplusage."
92. 7 So. 2d at 920. Similar situations in Louisiana jurisprudence have resulted in similar
outcomes.
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As used in statutes denouncing crimes, the word "willfully" means or
implies a purpose or willingness to commit the act. It implies a criminal
intent, a deliberate intention or set purpose to commit the act, or a
deliberate intention or purpose to injure or to do wrong, an evil design or
evil intent."3
B. Tax Cases
Recent Louisiana jurisprudence, however, has interpreted State v. Vinzant
narrowly, reasoning "in the context of a criminal charge 'willfully' and
'intentionally' have the same connotation." In State v. Neumeyer," a sales tax
case, the fourth circuit court argued that since willfully was the equivalent of
intentionally, and since "in the absence of qualifying provisions in a criminal
statute the terms 'intent' and 'intentional' have reference to general criminal
intent," s statutes that contain the word willfully, without qualifying provisions, are
general criminal intent crimes." Therefore, the court opined that willfully failing
to pay state sales taxes was only a general criminal intent crime," requiring an
objective test."
This approach is directly opposed to that one adopted by the federal courts.
The United States Supreme Court has adopted the standard of specific intent to
violate the law as an element of most federal criminal tax offenses, which is a
subjective test," ° since tax laws are "highly technical statutes that presented the
danger of ensnaring individuals engaged in apparently innocent conduct."'
0
'
Moreover, the Court has stated that for the purpose of federal criminal tax laws,
"willfulness" requires that the defendant desired an unlawful outcome, and he
knew that the result was illegal, not just that he intentionally acted in derogation of
the law; essentially, the Court made an exception to the general rule that "ignorance
of the law is no excuse" for federal tax crimes.102
93. Vinzant, 7 So. 2d at 922 (referring to 68 C.J. pp. 290, 291; "Willfully" in Webster's New
International Dictionary and also in 45 Words & Phrases, Perm. Ed., p. 286).
94. State v. Clark, 140 So. 2d 1 (La. 1962); State v. Neumeyer, 561 So. 2d 944, 945 (La. App.
4th Cir.), writ denied, 567 So. 2d 100 (1990).
95. 561 So. 2d 944 (La. App.4th Cir.), writ denied, 567 So. 2d 100 (1990).
96. La.R.S. 14:11 (1997).
97. 561 So. 2d at 945.
98. id. See also Hebert v. Talbot, 713 So. 2d 647 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1998). The Second Circuit
interpreted the "willful violation of a penal statute or ordinance" committed by or with the knowledge
or consent of any insured to require nothing more than general criminal intent.
99. La. R.S. 14:10(2) (1997) states: "General criminal intent is present whenever there is specific
intent, and also when the circumstances indicate that the offender, in the ordinary course of human
experience, must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result
from his act or failure to act."
100. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200, 111 S. Ct. 604, 609 (1991).
101. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 194, 118 S. Ct. 1939, 1946-47 (1998).
102. Cheek, 498 U.S. 192, 111 S. Ct. 604.
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A "willing" failure to file an income tax return presents a scenario where there
could be differing results, depending on the definition of willful.l°3 Assume A, B,
and C failed to file income tax returns for these reasons: A planned to file an
income tax return but was overcome with other matters and incidentally forgot to
file; B cautiously went over whether he had any tax consequences and erroneously
concluded that no income tax return was due; therefore, he intentionally missed the
final day in which to file income tax returns because he honestly believed that no
filing was required; and C intentionally did not file his income tax return, knowing
that he was required to do so in his given circumstance." ° Under federal revenue
law, all three would have engendered a sanctioned penalty (not a crime), but only
C would be guilty of the crime of failing to file an income tax return."W Though
B intentionally failed to file his income tax return, because he had no evil motive
or bad purpose, he would not be guilty of the crime of failing to file his tax
return.'06 For example, in Yarborough v. United States," even though the court
did not conclude that there was lack of knowledge, it found that a failure to file
income tax returns is not willful if a defendant was not aware of his duty to file."' 8
By contrast, C intended to deprive the government of taxes and consequently acted
with a bad purpose under the meaning of willful in federal tax revenue law, and is
in violation of that law."19
However, under Louisiana law the same equitable result might not occur since
in State v. Neumeyer"° the court stated, in broad language, that in the context of a
criminal charge, willfully is the equivalent of intentionally. Under this rationale,
B could also be convicted because he did intentionally fail to file an income tax
return even though he had a bona fide belief that there was no need to file. Could
the Louisiana Legislature have meant this result?"' It seems absurd and harsh,
especially since the Louisiana Supreme Court has acknowledged that many of
Louisiana's criminal tax statutes are "comparable" to those of the criminal federal
103. Louisiana has a number of criminal statutes dealing with "willfully" failing to file taxes much
like the federal tax provisions in the United States Code. See La. RS. 33:2845 (Supp. 1999); La. R.S.
33:2845.1 (Supp. 1999); La. R.S. 33:2846 (Supp. 1999); La. R.S. 47:1561.1 (Supp. 1999); La. R.S.
47:1641 (1990); La. R.S. 47:1642 (1990).
104. See Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald M. Boyce, Criminal Law, § 4, at 876 (3d ed. 1982).
105. Id. at 874.
106. It is well settled in federal law that willfully attempting to evade income tax "means more than
intentionally or voluntarily, and includes an evil motive or bad purpose, so that evidence of an actual
bona fide misconception of the law, such as would negative knowledge of the existence of the
obligation," would result in an acquittal. Wardlaw v. United States, 203 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1953).
107. 230 F.2d 56 (4th Cir. 1956).
108. Perkins & Boyce, supra note 104, § 4, at 878 n.36.
109. Perkins & Boyce, supra note 104, § 4, at 878.
110. 561 So. 2d 944 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 567 So. 2d 100 (La. 1990).
111. The United States Supreme Court has stated even unambiguous statutes should not be
construed to result in "injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be
presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language, which would avoid results of this
character." United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482 (1869).
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tax statutes in the United States Code." 2 Furthermore, in State v. DeJesus,113 the
Louisiana Supreme Court looked to the federal tax definition of the term "person"
and applied that definition to an analogous Louisiana tax provision.14 The federal
interpretation should also be applied when interpreting the term willful.
In State v. Main Motors, Inc., a prosecution for the willful failure to collect
or truthfully account for or pay state sales tax," 6 the Louisiana Supreme Court held
that proof of willful behavior "requires that the mind of the defendant be
probed."'"7 Undoubtedly, the court excluded negligence; however, it is not clear
whether the court required general criminal intent or specific intent."' If Louisiana
adopted the clear federal standard developed by the United States Supreme Court,
one would have to probe the mind of the defendant to find if he knew of the duty
to collect and truthfully account for or pay state sales tax, and also whether he
"actively desired""' 9 to violate this duty. Presumably, the federal standard
mandates something more than a specific intent requirement 20 because it also
requires knowledge of the legal duty. For policy reasons, this standard would
effectuate favorable results and solve much of the vagueness problem in the
Louisiana tax statutes that have a willfulness requirement, because more must be
proven under this interpretation of the requirement.
When considering Louisiana Revised Statutes 47:1641... and Louisiana
Revised Statutes 47:1642,122 which contain the phrases "willfully fails to collect or
truthfully account for" and "willfully fails to file any return or report," respectively,
the court should interpret the willfulness requirement to mean more than just
112. State v. DeJesus, 642 So. 2d 854, 856 (La. 1994).
113. Id. at 856.
114. Id.
115. 383 So. 2d 327 (La. 1980).
116. La. R.S. 47:1641 (1950).
117. 383 So. 2d at 329.
118. Hargrave, supra note 17, at 544.
119. La. R.S. 14:10(1) (1997) states: "Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists
when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences
to follow his act or failure to act."
120. In addition to proving the defendant "actively desired" an unlawful result, which is the
specific intent standard in Louisiana, one must prove that the defendant knew of the duty.
121. La. R.S. 47:1641 (1990) states:
Any person required under this subtitle to collect, account for, or pay over any tax, penalty,
or interest imposed by this subtitle, who willfully fails to collect or truthfully account for or
pay over such tax, penalty, or interest, shall in addition to other penalties provided by law,
be fined not more than ten thousand dollars or imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for
not more than five years, or both.
122. La. R.S. 47:1642 (1990) states:
Any person who willfully fails to file any return or report required to be filed by the
provisions of this Sub-title, or who willfully files or causes to be filed, with the collector, any
false or fraudulent return, report, or statement or who willfully aids or abets another in the
filing with the collector of any false or fraudulent return, report or statement, with the intent
to defraud the state or evade the payment of any tax, fee, penalty or interest, or any part
thereof, which shall be due pursuant to the provisions of this Sub-title, shall be fined not
more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or imprisoned for more than one year, or both.
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general intent or specific intent. The Louisiana courts should require a finding that
the accused knew of the duty to collect or file. Otherwise, these statutes would
punish almost all failures to collect or file returns because any failure could be
considered willful. This result can be analogized to statutes that punish for certain
omissions. For instance, the hit-and-run driving statute of the Louisiana Criminal
Statutes punishes those for intentional failure to report an accident.lu In such a
statute almost any failure would be considered intentional. Presumably, a better
outcome would require the defendant to know that he has a legal duty to report but
then not to report, much like in Cheek and Ratzlaf. Perhaps Louisiana Revised
Statutes 47:1641 and Louisiana Revised Statutes 47:1642 are preferred statutes
because they use willfully instead of intentionally to modify failures, and the term
"willfully" "typically [also] refers to a culpable state of mind" in criminal
statutes.
24
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court made it clear in Cheek that it
would entertain claims in the federal system of good faith mistakes and sincere
beliefs. Such defenses should be entertained in the state tax system as well, to
obtain more equitable results.'25 Louisiana should adhere to the federal tax law
concept that one must know when he is in violation of a tax statute for his act to be
considered criminal.
Moreover, State v. Neumeyer 2 6 could cause future complications in other
areas due to the fact that its broad language can be construed to mean that all
statutes that contain willfully, absent qualifying provisions, require only general
criminal intent, thereby making willfully synonymous with intentionally. This
reasoning should be rejected because there are some statutes that contain the
"general intent formulation" where courts have relied on sound policy reasons to
import a more rigorous mental element.'27 Louisiana should now follow the United
123. La. R.S. 14:100 (Supp. 1999) states:
A. Hit and run driving is the intentional failure of the driver of a vehicle involved in or
causing any accident, to stop such vehicle at the scene of the accident, to give his identity,
and to render reasonable aid.
B.(I) "To give his identity", means that the driver of any vehicle involved in any accident
shall give his name, and the license number of his vehicle, or shall report the accident to
the police.
(emphasis added).
124. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191, 118 S. Ct. 1939, 1945 (1998).
125. The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a recent well-reasoned opinion,
determined the requirement of willfulness in federal tax laws regarding failure to file is pertinent in
interpreting the willfulness requirement of the Child Support Recovery Act. Although the Child
Support Recovery Act's legislative history expressly stated that the willfulness requirement should be
interpreted in the same way as in federal tax statutes, the court and the legislature seemed to base this
interpretation on the "similarity between" these statutes. United States v. Mathes, 151 F.3d 251 (5th
Cir. 1998); Louisiana should also analogize its tax laws to similar federal tax laws and interpret these
statutes like the United States Supreme Court does because it will lead to more equitable results..
126. 561 So. 2d 944 (La. App. 4th Cir.)
127. See Dale E. Bennett and Chaney C. Joseph, the Louisiana Criminal Code of 1942-Doctrinal
Provisions, Defenses and Theories of Culpability, 52 La. L Rev. 1083, 1091 (1992). See State v. Fuller,
414 So. 2d 306 (La. 1982); See also State v. Fluker, 311 So. 2d 863 (La. 1975).
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States Supreme Court's Cheek decision, making the well-reasoned policy choice
that if an accused honestly believes that he was not involved in unlawful activities
at the time of the alleged violation, he should not be convicted of willfully failing
to file income taxes. Moreover, Louisiana courts should not apply an inflexible
definition to willfully, making it strictly equivalent to intentionally in criminal
statutes, because willfully takes on different meanings in different contexts and
such a confined meaning could cause innocent mistakes to be criminally punished.
C. Contempt Cases
The Louisiana courts have also struggled with both civil'28 and criminal'29
contempt of court statutes that include the willfulness requirement. In New
Orleans Fire Fighters Ass'n Local 632 v. City of New Orleans,'3" the court stated
that "willful disobedience" is a prerequisite to a violation of contempt of court
under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 224; without such a finding, there
is no constructive contempt.' The court also noted the struggle it had in
determining what the term "willful" meant in constructive contempt of court
matters, concluding that willful means "an act or failure to act that is done
intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse."' The court
stated that if the accused makes an erroneous interpretation of the law-for
example, if the accused believes that he is in compliance with the law-there is no
willful disobedience.
33
There is a noticeable similarity between the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeal's discussion of willful disobedience in constructive contempt matters and
the United States Supreme Court's holdings in Cheek and Ratzlaf. Much like the
United States Supreme Court in Cheek, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeal seems to make the logical proposition that if an accused honestly believes
that he was not in violation of the court's orders or laws, he should not be
128. La. Code Crim. P. art. 224 defines a"constructive contempt of court" as "any contempt other
than a direct one" and lists ten specific acts which constitute a contempt of court. "Willful disobedience
of any lawful judgment, order, mandate, writ or process of the court" is second on that list.
129. La. Code. Crim. P. art. 23 provides in pertinent part:
A constructive contempt of court is any contempt other than a direct one.
A constructive contempt includes, but is not limited to any of the following acts:
(1) Willful neglect or violation of duty by a clerk, sheriff, or person elected, appointed,
or employed to assist the court in the administration ofjustice;
(2) Willful disobedience of any lawful judgment, order, mandate, writ, or process of
court;
(3) Willful disobedience by an inferior court, judge, or other official thereof, of the
lawful judgment, order, mandate, writ, or process of an appellate court, rendered in
connection with an appeal from ajudgment or order of the inferior court, or in connection
with a review of such judgment or order under a supervisory writ.
130. 260 So. 2d 779 (La. App. 4th Cir.), affd, 269 So. 2d 194 (La. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
933, 93 S. Ct. 1902 (1973).
131. New Orleans Fire Fighters Ass'n Local 632, 260 S. 2d at 786.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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convicted. Presumably, this is a subjective test. This is certainly a reasonable
approach because the state should not punish those that do not realize they are in
violation of a court order. However, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal
seems to have deviated from this reasonable approach in tax situations, potentially
subjecting innocent mistakes to criminal prosecution." The fourth circuit's
analysis in contempt cases seems more correct.
Several courts in civil contempt cases have adopted a similar rule.135 Although
the decision in New Orleans Fire Fighters Ass 'n Local 632 appears to be sound
when attaching such a definition with the term willful, there is a risk that a court
will interpret the contempt of court statute as requiring only general criminal intent
such as the court did in State v. Neumeyer.'36 However, one can infer that the court
in New Orleans Fire Fighters Ass'n Local 632 intended a subjective test in order
to preclude apparently faultless actions or inactions from being penalized.
In State in the Interest of R.J.S., D.F.S., and J.A.G., 131 the Louisiana Supreme
Court stated:
Willful disobedience of a court order requires a consciousness of the duty
to obey the order and the intent to disregard that duty. The purpose of
charging and convicting a defendant for criminal contempt is vindication
of the public interest by punishment of contemptuous conduct. Therefore,
in order to constitute willful disobedience necessary for criminal
contempt, the act or refusal to act must be done with an intent to defy the
authority of the court. 1
38
Such a definition is more precise and consistent with policy decisions the courts
appear to invoke.
D. Possession
The jurisprudential rule regarding joint possession of narcotics could also
cause further confusion and punish thoseinvolved in seemingly innocent conduct.
In State v. Sweeney, 139 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a person may be
deemed to be in joint possession if he willfully and knowingly shares with a
companion the right to control the narcotic. This vague, obscure language has
caused confusion, and as some courts have reasoned, "[t]he jurisprudence has not
established precise guidelines as to what constitutes 'possession' of drugs under
134. State v. Neumeyer, 561 So. 2d 944 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 567 So. 2d 100 (La.
1990).
135. Kirby v. Kirby, 579 So. 2d 508 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991); Alagdon v. Guerton, 701 So. 2d 480
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1997); Nelson v. Nelson, 421 So. 2d 366 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982); Riley v. Pennix,
442 So. 2d 563 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
136. Neumeyer, 561 So. 2d 944.
137. 493 So. 2d 1199 (La. 1986).
138. Id. at 1202 (citations omitted).
139. 443 So. 2d 522,529 (La. 1983). See also State v. Trahan, 425 So. 2d 1222 (La. 1983); State
v. Knight, 298 So. 2d 726 (La. 1974). This is not in the statute but is ajurisprudential rle established
by the courts of Louisiana.
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narcotics law."'" Does the term "willfully" actually aid the courts in finding
whether or not a defendant had joint possession? Presumably, this language is
unnecessary, or perhaps the courts desired to insert a requirement of moral
blameworthiness through the term. Conceivably, Louisiana's only aid in the matter
is its jurisprudential rules on constructive possession, which do not contain this
imprecise term 4' and the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for criminal
cases. 1
42
E. What Is or Is Not Wilifulness
In State v. Vinzant,43 the court also defined what willfully is not. The court
stated:
Accurately speaking, the terms "negligence" and "willfulness" are
incompatible, and signify the opposites of each other, in that absence of
intent is a distinguishing characteristic of negligence, whereas willfulness
cannot exist without purpose or design, and a willful injury will not be
inferred when the result may be reasonably attributed to negligence or
inattention.'"
Furthermore, in State v. Feltus141 the court reiterated the same line of
reasoning, stating that in cases where these words are used in the same context, the
term willfully should be regarded as mere surplusage." Moreover, in State v.
D.L.,47 the court made the assumption that willful always refers to either specific
or general criminal intent and therefore should not be used in the same context as
criminal negligence. While all of these cases dealt with the erroneous inclusion of
the term willful in a bill of information, or petition and affidavit in the case of the
minor, the courts seem to extend their analysis to what willfulness is not. Such
broad language is not totally correct, at least in the eyes of the legislature. For
instance, Louisiana Revised Statutes 47:1604 provides for a negligence penalty in
140. Trahan, 425 So. 2d at 1226; State v. Gordon, 646 So. 2d 995 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994).
141. A defendant may be in constructive possession of a controlled dangerous substance if it is
subject to his dominion and control, regardless of whether or not it is in his physical possession. See
State v. Edwards, 354 So. 2d 1322, 1327 (La. 1978); State v. Tasker, 448 So. 2d 1311, 1314 (La. App.
1st Cir.), writ denied, 450 So. 2d 644 (La. 1984). Several factors may be considered in determining
whether or not a defendant exercised "dominion and control" over a drug, including: a defendant's
knowledge that controlled dangerous substances are in the area; the defendant's relationship with the
person found to be in actual possession; the defendant's access to the area where the drugs were; prior
drug use by the defendant; the defendant's physical proximity to the narcotics; and any evidence that
the particular area was a haven for drug users. State v. Tasker, 448 So. 2d at 1314. See also State v.
Love, 527 So. 2d 62, 64 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988).
142. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979).
143. 7 So. 2d 917 (La. 1942).
144. Id. at 922 (citing 45 C.J. 672).
145. 101 So. 2d 682 (La. 1958).
146. But see Potter v. United States, 155 U.S. 438, 15 S. Ct. 144 (1894); cf. text accompanying
infra notes 153 and 154 (willful should not be regarded as mere surplusage when interpreting a statute).
147. 697 So. 2d 706,709 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1997).
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tax situations when the taxpayer's actions indicate "willful negligence or
intentional disregard of rules and regulations."'" Negligence assumes a risk that
an offender should have known; presumably, in many statutes that describe this in
terms of an omission or a failure to act, intentional seems a somewhat illogical term
to modify these words and phrases. 49 A more correct term to use might be willful.
This proves the chameleon-like nature of the term. In the struggle for precision, it
becomes obvious that "there are inherent limitations in the use of language; few
words [such as willful] possess the precision of mathematical symbols. ' ' S"
V. A COMMON SENSE INQUIRY
In the theft of goods provision found in Louisiana Revised Statutes Title 14,
the statute states that a violation of this offense occurs, inter alia, "when a person
[w]illfully causes the cash register or other sales recording device to reflect less
than the actual retail price."'' A determination of what willfully means here is
virtually impossible. The term does not establish a mental element because theft
is currently a specific intent crime in Louisiana. It is required that there be "[ain
intent to deprive the other person permanently of whatever may be the subject of
the misappropriation or taking.. .. " Therefore, if willfully was included because
the legislature sought to draft a statute where one could not be prosecuted for
148. La. R.S. 47:1604.1 (1990), entitled "Negligence Penalty," provides in pertinent part: "If any
taxpayer fails to make any return required by this Sub-title or makes an incorrect return, and the
circumstances indicate willful negligence or intentional disregard of rules and regulations.
(emphasis added).
149. Butsee La. R.S. 14:111 (1997), entitled "AssistingEscape," which provides in pertinentpart:
"Assisting escape is the: (1) Permitting, by any public officer, of the escape of any prisoner in his
custody, by virtue of his active assistance or intentional failure to act." See also La. R.S. 30:2246(B),
which provides in pertinent part:
Upon the failure of a disposer or generator to file the contribution report by October 1, 1984,
or upon the timely filing of an incorrect report with the circumstances indicating negligence
or intentional disregard of the requirement of this charter or the requirements and rules and
regulations of the seretary....
150. Wayne R. LaFave& Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 2.3 (2d ed. 1986) (citing Grayned
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S. Ct. 2294 (1972)).
151. L. R.S. 14:67.10 (1997), entitled "Theft of Goods," provides in pertinent part:
A. Theft of goods is the misappropriation or taking of anything of value which is held for
sale by a merchant, either without the consent of the merchant to the misappropriation or
taking, or by means of fraudulent conduct, practices, or representations. An intent to
deprive the merchant permanently of whatever may be the subject of the misappropriation
or taking is essential and may be inferred when a person:
(4) Willfully causes the cash register or other sales device to reflect less than the actual
retail price of the goods....
152. La. R.S. 14:67 (1997), entitled "Theft," provides in pertinent part:
(A) Theft is the misappropriation or taking of anything of value which belongs to another,
either without the consent of the other to the misappropriation or taking, or by means of
fraudulent conduct, practices, or representations. An intent to deprive permanently of
whatever may be the subject of the misappropriation or taking is essential.
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accidentally causing the cash register or recording device to reflect less, it was
unnecessary because an essential requirement of theft is the intent to deprive.
Does willful mean anything in this statute? In Potter v. United States,'53 the
United States Supreme Court stated that the inclusion of the term "willful" should
not be omitted from a statute when interpreting it; it should not "be regarded as
mere surplusage; it means something."'" 4 Maybe the only thing this term means in
the theft of goods statute is that the legislature desired to be cautious.'55
VI. A PROPOSED SOLUTION-ACHIEVING AN EQUITABLE OUTCOME
As a policy matter, courts should interpret the willfulness requirement
embodied in some of the Louisiana criminal statutes to render more predictable
results. If a criminal statute contains the term willfully but leaves its meaning
ambiguous and susceptible to several interpretations, a specific intent standard
could accommodate the vagueness problem. If a court refuses to make a
determination as to the meaning of the willfulness requirement in certain
ambiguous criminal statutes, it should opt for strict construction of the criminal
statute. "As the United States Supreme Court has put it, 'ambiguity concerning the
ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity. """ In addition, the
Supreme Court has stated that "where a statute is susceptible of two constructions,
by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other
of which such questions are avoided, [the court's] duty is to adopt the latter."'5 If
any of the aforementioned options were adopted, they would lead to more favorable
results in Louisiana.
VII. CONCLUSION: IS WILLFULNESS WORTH IT?
If the term willfully must be used in criminal statutes, its ambiguity and
vagueness in those statutes that contain no ascertainable definitions should prompt
the court to rule for the defendant. The Federal Jury Practice and Instructions
chapter on mental states began its exploration of determining how to interpret the
term willfully by stating that one must examine the underlying policy
considerations and analyze the grammatical structure to ascertain which words are
153. 155 U.S. 438, 15 S. Ct. 144(1894).
154. Id. at 446, 15 S. Ct. at 147.
155. Notice a similar approach taken by the Louisiana Legislature in the stalking statute, which
is also a specific intent crime. See La. R.S. 14:40.2 (1997).
156. LaFave&Scott, supra note 150 (citing Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808,91 S. Ct. 1056
(1971)). See also Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 105 S. Ct. 2084 (1985); United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,98 S. Ct. 2864 (1978); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336,
92 S. Ct. 515 (1971); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 75 S. Ct. 620 (1955).
157. LaFave & Scott, supra note 150 (citing United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware
& Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 29 S. Ct. 527 (1909)).
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modified by the term. 5 8 However, as Justice Rehnquist stated in his dissent in
United States v. Yermian,'5 9 "[I1t is quite impossible to tell which phrases the term
'knowingly and willfully' modify, and the magic wand of ipse dixit does nothing
to resolve the ambiguity. ' ' "W Consequently, Justice Rehnquist would have opted
for the rule of lenity in Yermian. Furthermore, the Federal Jury Practice and
Instructions have concluded that although knowingly does not have an easily
ascertainable interpretation in statutes, the term willfully is "even more
ambiguous."''
In the Supreme Court of Louisiana, Justice Dennis expressed his anxiety over
the vagueness of a state sales tax statute with the willfulness requirement. 62 In
Bryan, Justice Scalia stated in his dissent that the federal licensing requirement was
inherently ambiguous due to the term willfully, and that such "doubts... [should
be] resolved in favor of the defendant."' 63 Imposing liability on a defendant when
there are serious concerns about the uncertainty and vagueness of willful in
criminal statutes conflicts with our notions of due process, particularly the
requirement of notice.' These are issues that should be further explored by the
courts as well as the legislature when drafting statutes.
The courts have not been alone in their concern with the term and their
struggle to define it. The Senate Judiciary Committee confirmed the perplexity of
the term when discussing the "intentional" culpability requirement and the
subsequent varying interpretations of "willfulness" covered under the "intentional"
mental element.'65
Perhaps the legislature could define the term willfully to prevent future
uncertainty in the applicable Louisiana Criminal Statutes. One option could be to
adopt the Model Penal Code statute or one similar to it which defines willfully.
Model Penal Code Section 2.02(8) states, "A requirement that an offense be
committed willfully is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the
material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements
appears." To ensure that the definition will not be immutable in every given
circumstance, which will often lead to poor results, the Model Penal Code drafters
158. Devitt et al., supra note 76.
159. 468 U.S. 63, 104 S. Ct. 2936 (1984).
160. Id. at 69, 104 S. Ct. at 2939.
161. Devittetal..supranote76at§ 17.01.
162. State v. Main Motors, 383 So. 2d 327, 329 (La. 1980) (Dennis, J. concurring).
163. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 200, 118S. Ct. 1939, 1950 (1998) (quoting Adams
Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 284-85,98 S. Ct. 566 (1978) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
164. "It is possible willfully to bring about certain results and yet be without fair warning that such
conduct is proscribed." LaFave & Scott, supra note 150, § 2.3, at 131. But see Screws v. United States,
325 U.S. 91, 101-02, 65 S. Ct. 1031, 1036 (1945) (Douglas, J. concurring) where the concurring
opinion stated:
A statutory requirement that an act must be willful or purposeful may not render certain, for
all purposes, a statutory definition of the crime which is in some respects uncertain. But it
does relieve the statute of the objection that it punishes without warning an offense of which
the accused is unaware.
165. Model Crim. Jury Instr. 9th Cir. § 5.5 (West ed. 1997) (discussing the Senate Judiciary
Committee). See S. 1437, 9th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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attached the phrase "unless a purpose to impose further requirements appears."
This phrase limits the definition to only those statutes where the legislature has not
assigned a different interpretation. As desirable as a definition like the Model
Penal Code's may be, it may be of little use in many Louisiana criminal statutes
where the legislature seems to impose other meanings. Moreover, the drafters of
the Model Penal Code stated that the term is "unusually ambiguous."'6
Furthermore, the commentators for the Code did not even contemplate utilizing it
as a culpability requirement in the Code." If the Model Penal Code will not even
use the term and its ensuing definition, should Louisiana? Presumably, no. This
is evident from a conversation between Judge Learned Hand and Herbert Wechsler,
drafter of the Code, discussing the use of "willful" in the Code:
Judge Hand: Do you use... [willfully] throughout? How often do you
use it? It's a dreadful word.
Mr. Wechsler: We will never use it in the Code, but we are
superimposing this on offenses outside the Code. It was for this purpose
that I thought that this was useful. I would never use it.
Judge Hand: Maybe it is useful. It's an awful word! It is one of the most
troublesome words in a statute that I know. If I were to have the index
purged, "willful" would lead all the rest in spite of its being at the end of
the alphabet.
Mr. Wechsler: I agree with you Judge Hand, and I promise you
unequivocally that the word will never be used in the definition of any
offense in the Code....'"
Due to the almost universal recognition of the troublesome nature of the
willfulness requirement in many criminal statutes, when courts are faced with this
dilemma, as an equitable decision, they should analogize to the federal
requirements of tax offenses and structuring transactions. Policy demands just
outcomes, especially in those highly specialized areas such as tax. Until the
legislature defines the term or abolishes it in statutes in Louisiana, or the Louisiana
166. Model Penal Code, explanatory note to § 2.02 (8), at 228.
167. ALl Proceedings 160 (1955). The Model Penal Code explanatory note to § 2.02 states that
"the term 'willfully' is not used in the definitions of crimes contained in the Code ... ;" it is only
defined because of "its currency and existence in offenses outside the criminal code suggest the
desirability of clarification."
168. AL Proceedings 160 (1955). But see American Sur. Co. of New York v. Sullivan, 7 F.2d
605,606 (2d Cir. 1925), where in Judge Learned Hand's earlier years he had a simpler view of the term
as opposed to his perceptive ideas of the problems of the term when speaking with Mr. Herbert
Wechsler. Judge Learned Hand had stated: "The word 'wilful,' even in criminal statutes, means no
more than the person charged with the duty knows what he is doing. It does not mean that, in addition,
he must suppose that he is breaking the law."
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courts resort to sound policy decisions, innocent defendants in these cases will
continue to be actual victims of our justice system.
Misty D. Shannon*
* The author wishes to acknowledge W. Lee Hargrave, Wex S. Malone Professor of Law at
Louisiana State University, for his advice and guidance regarding this article.
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